Clinical trials in neonatology often raise complex ethical problems. This paper suggests that in tackling these it is useful to identify and separate out those elements of the problem that are genuinely ethical 
Introduction
If neonates are to receive the best possible treatment, clinical trials involving them must take place. However, doing such trials raises complicated ethical issues.
These issues are not unique to neonatology but some of them may be more common or acute than in other areas of medicine. This paper focuses on two issues in particular, equipoise and informed consent. These issues themselves arise as many different types of problem in practice. The paper begins, however, with the question, "What is an ethical issue?" This is of importance as sometimes, issues that are not ethical are mistakenly thought to be so and vice versa. Furthermore, once we recognise what type of problems are ethical we can also recognise the correct means to tackle them.
What is an ethical issue?
Isaiah Berlin usefully distinguished three types of questions:
empirical, formal and philosophical. 1 Empirical questions are those that are, in principle at least, answerable by reference to sensory experience: observation, experiment and the like. Similarly, empirical science is that which tackles such questions. Formal questions are answerable by reference to a man-made system, such as mathematics, games or law. Questions such as "What is the square root of 9?" or "How does the knight move in chess" are answerable by applying the relevant formal system, not by observation of the world.
Clearly many questions will combine both types. "How many chairs are there in the room?" is empirical and formal. However, it is primarily empirical.
Finally, there are philosophical questions. These are those that have no obvious empirical or formal method for answering them but which nonetheless appear to make sense. They belong academically within and whether a consent waiver should be given.
In the rest of this paper we shall consider some of these issues. We focus on two in particular, although we shall brush against other issues in our discussion (such as the desperate volunteer problem).
The first is equipoise, the second, informed consent.
Equipoise
As an example, the issue of equipoise arose in setting up the UK collaborative trial of extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO). 5 At the time it was set up, two studies had been performed the results of which, it was argued, might have undermined equipoise. [6] [7] [8] The trial organisers argued, however, that the unconventional design of the previous studies undermined their credibility and that, therefore, We do not take issue with this conclusion. However, it is a good example from which to illustrate the complexity of equipoise (a concept on which there is a vast literature). At the heart of this complexity is the way equipoise combines both empirical and philosophical judgement. Equipoise is not simply a matter of whether or not we know that a treatment works or doesn't work.
Clinical trials are set up to avoid error to a certain degree. At the end of a trial we may typically be able to say that we can conclude that a treatment is effective with a certain level of certainty: if we have p=0.01 we can say that drawing such a conclusion will be wrong on one occasion in a hundred. This is not the same as saying we know with absolute certainty; very little in medicine is known to this degree.
What is important is that we believe it is certain enough to act upon.
And it is the link to action that makes equipoise particularly difficult.
When a clinician says he is in equipoise he means he does not know whether he should or should not give a certain treatment to his patients: an action. However, deciding whether or not to act is not simply a matter of empirical knowledge. We act on the basis of what we know but also of our values. If someone knows there is a pound coin on the road, whether or not she picks it up will be a function of how important the money is to her compared to other values, such as how important her time is or how important her well-being should there be traffic on the road. When a clinician decides to give a treatment it is because she knows it has been shown to be effective (to a certain level of certainty) and she values the outcome of palliation or treatment. In most cases this is straightforward and clinicians will hardly notice the value judgement running alongside the empirical one.
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The times when it is not straightforward are where decision-makers disagree either over the empirical or the value judgement. Our concern here is with the latter. A good example is the judgement of whether or not to treat very premature infants. The disagreement between clinicians is not usually empirical: they all know the relevant empirical evidence. Rather it is ethical, of values: they disagree over whether the small chance of survival, and the quality of life of those who do survive, is worthwhile both in terms of resources and in terms of the best interest of the infant itself.
In that equipoise concerns a decision to act, to give a treatment, it follows that whether or not one is in equipoise regarding treatments will also be a function of values. A clinician may not share the equipoise of her peers not because she disagrees about the empirical evidence but because her values differ from theirs. She may, for example, think that a side-effect is particularly undesirable and that a new treatment which risks it should be avoided.
In setting up clinical trials, therefore, the question is not simply whether there is equipoise but whose equipoise should matter. In many trials this is not a problem as all relevant parties are either in equipoise or are, at least, indifferent between treatment arms in a trial. This will be the case most commonly when there is not too much at stake, as in some feeding trials. Controversy is more likely where the trial is into an intervention that is a potential treatment for a dangerous or debilitating condition for which current treatment is unsatisfactory, such as perinatal asphyxia. Here, whilst there may be equipoise across the clinical community, it may be that parents do not share it. Qualitative research involving trials in just such situations (the ECMO and TOBY studies) 9;10 found that many parents who gave consent for their neonate to take part in such studies were far from indifferent between treatment arms; they wanted their child to receive the new treatment. Why should clinicians' equipoise, and therefore values, take precedence over parents' in this situation?
An alternative way of phrasing this question is to ask whether, in order for it to be ethical to set up and run a clinical trial, equipoise must obtain amongst all relevant participants, clinicians and parents.
Such a stipulation would result in it being impossible to run randomised trials of treatments for the most debilitating and dangerous conditions. One would, instead, have to run nonrandomised trials using, say, historical controls. As a result, one might argue, the areas most in need of strong evidence for treatments would have only weak evidence. However, where one runs randomised trials one runs into the problem of desperate volunteers.
These are parents who agree to take part in the randomised trial only because it offers them a 50/50 chance of getting their child the treatment they want, rather than no chance at all outside the trial. written on the subject this paper is unlikely to be the last word, however.
Informed consent
We turn now to informed consent. In any discussion of this topic it is useful to have three questions in the back of one's mind:
Clinical
What is informed consent?
Why does it matter?
How much does it matter?
These are philosophical/ethical questions. The first is about the nature of informed consent, the second and third are about its value.
Typically one finds that controversies about informed consent may involve some confusion between the two areas. Take the question of whether or not a thirteen-year-old girl can consent to the pill.
Disputants may argue that such a girl is unlikely to have the maturity to make such a decision (a dispute about the nature of consent); or they may argue that the girl's decision should not be allowed to override her parents' views (a dispute about the value of consent).
And often the argument will confuse the two areas; it pays to keep them separate. Using the nature/value framework, let us turn to the topic of informed consent in relation to clinical trials in neonatology.
Nature of informed consent
The most obvious point is that the research subject can never consent him or herself; the parents must do that. In order for the parental consent to be ethically sound and/or legally valid it should probably meet the standards applied to all other consent. 12 In other words, it should meet various criteria. First, those giving consent should be competent to do so; second, those giving consent should have adequate information and understand that information; and, finally, those giving consent should do so voluntarily, without coercion.
The main concern in neonatology has been that consent to clinical trials falls short of one or more of those criteria. This is particularly so in trials on very ill neonates and where the time available in which to consent is short. Such circumstances could undermine all the criteria. In relation to competence, the mother may have had a traumatic birth involving drugs that render her unable to think At least two studies have suggested that at least some of these problems do eventuate in practice. 13;14 There is also evidence that parents who give consent for a trial in the early neonatal period later forget having done so. 15 One response of neonatologists has been to look to ways of improving the consent process, particularly in urgent and emergency trials. An example of this is the TOBY trial, assessing the effectiveness of whole-body cooling in the treatment of neonatal asphyxia. This is precisely the sort of trial where one might expect consent to be compromised: the treatment is for a life-threatening condition; the parents are usually unaware of any problem prenatally; the trial is randomized; and the time available in which to decide about trial entry is short.
Aware of these problems, the TOBY TSC took pains to develop what it hoped would be an effective means of obtaining informed consent.
This has two elements. The first is clinician training in the process of obtaining consent for the TOBY study, including role-play. The second is continuous consent: parents are given initial information about the trial, then further information if they are interested; finally, while the baby is getting the trial treatment, a clinician goes through the study with them again, checking understanding and ensuring they are happy for the trial to continue. A recent qualitative study of parents who gave consent to this trial suggests that these measures have had a good effect. 9 Perhaps, then, clinicians should not be too hasty in believing it is impossible to get informed consent to some neonatal trials. They should also beware the "counsel of perfection". Informed consent should not be viewed as an ideal to which we aspire but which we can never obtain. Every decision in life is made against the backdrop of human frailties and uncertainty. There is no reason to aspire for to a standard of consent that is above this. Nonetheless, there may be situations in which it is impossible to achieve informed consent: the mother is unconscious and the father absent; there is extremely limited time available; the parents both have a learning disability.
There may also be situations in which obtaining informed consent comes at a great cost. This may be in time and effort, as in epidemiological studies where it is now difficult to trace the parents to ask for consent. Or it may be emotional cost to the parents. In both ECMO and TOBY, there was evidence from qualitative studies that parents who gave consent and whose babies were then randomized to receive the control treatment were disappointed, sometimes bitterly.
Are there times when we should forego consent? Answering this question requires that we look at the value of informed consent.
Value of informed consent
In considering the value of informed consent we need to think about what it is for. The standard reason is that its purpose is to respect people's autonomy. As Dworkin puts it: 16 "All discussions of the nature of informed consent and its rationale refer to patient (or subject) autonomy" (p.5)
However, this sits a little awkwardly in neonatology. The term "autonomy" means, literally, "self-rule". Clearly the neonate cannot self-rule; and the decisions of the parents on its behalf are, to borrow Kant's term, heteronomous. What, then, is the role of their consent?
To answer this question is to call into question Dworkin's suggestion.
Informed consent as a doctrine in medical research did not originate primarily as a method to safeguard autonomy; it was, rather, to safeguard well-being. Both the Nuremberg Code and the Helsinki Declaration emphasise the consent of research subjects/participants.
Their origin was in the exposure of the horrific research performed in Nazi Germany. [17] [18] [19] The thought is that people do not usually put themselves into trials that expose them to unreasonable risk and harm.
This, then, may be one of the purposes of proxy parental consent on behalf of neonates; to safeguard them from harm. However, in this role it may be of fairly limited use. Clearly, parents will wish to safeguard their neonates. However, so do Research Ethics
Committees, TSCs and DMECs as well as clinicians themselves. It is unlikely that parental consent contributes much to the protection of the neonate in clinical trials. So perhaps it has another role, one that we might express in terms of social recognition of the importance of families and parents. Our society is organised in such a way that children are brought up primarily within families. Parents take on the main responsibility and are required to make decisions on their behalf. They may not do so perfectly; but our respect for that system manifests itself in a respect for parental decision-making albeit imperfect.
This seems to give us a better handle on why parents should be asked their permission for neonates to be entered into clinical trials. If it is correct it helps us also in relation to what to do about consent that is of poor quality. For, faced with the difficulty of getting a reasonable quality of informed consent in some studies, some have argued we should waive the requirement for it. 20 Perhaps, though, if we think in terms of obtaining the best consent possible in the circumstances, rather than informed consent of the type one would hope for in usual circumstances, we would be less concerned. If the role of parental consent is primarily to acknowledge the parental role then "best possible consent" does this job well enough.
We are still left, though, with difficult cases and difficult choices.
Manning's point is not simply that getting informed consent to emergency neonatal research is difficult (or impossible); it is also that it is costly. It will inevitably take some time. One might test an intervention that is effective but only if performed very quickly. A requirement for consent of any kind might result in our never knowing this. Another cost is in the distress caused to parents.
It is perhaps possible to deal with Manning's point about distress to parents. The research available thus far suggests that even though parents recognise the difficulty and emotional pain caused through involvement in decisions about research and treatment, they do not wish to be excluded. 15;21 Similarly, the argument that Zelen randomization be used to protect the parents whose babies are randomized to the control group 22 is undermined by research suggesting that these are precisely the parents who would find such randomization objectionable. 23 This is evidence of the importance of the parental role from parents' own perspectives.
Manning's problem of the cost to emergency neonatal research itself of the consent requirement is not so easily dismissed. The argument here has shown why parental consent is very important, why it should not be put lightly to one side. However, is it so important that some 
Clinical practice points
• When tackling ethical problems it is useful to distinguish between empirical, formal and philosophical elements of the problem.
• The philosophical elements must be tackled using techniques appropriate, such as systematic argument.
• One cannot answer philosophical questions empirically; this lack of empirical assuredness can be frustrating for clinicians.
• In neonatal randomised trials, clinicians sometimes recruit parents who are not in equipoise between the different treatment arms; they are desperate volunteers. Such recruitment is an ethical problem but may be defensible provided there is equipoise in the clinical community.
• Circumstances can make it difficult to obtain good quality informed consent to neonatal trials. This problem can be reduced to some extent through strategies such as continuous consent.
• Clinicians should avoid a "counsel of perfection" -obtaining the best consent in the circumstances is often good enough.
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Research agenda
• Research into ethical issues will involve different methodologies from standard empirical research. Some empirical work is usually helpful but at some point it is always necessary to undertake philosophical work.
